What happens when the Czech Republic is attacked by a ballistic missile

We assume that a ballistic missile is aiming to attack an area on the line between the town of Příbram in Western Bohemia and the capital city of Prague.

1. An energetically optimal ballistic missile trajectory (the highest point 600 kilometres)

In an ideal situation, if the whole anti-missile system is in a state of 100 per cent alert, a ballistic missile can be probably detected by the radar at the earliest some 345 -- 375 seconds after take off, at a distance of 700 -- 795 kilometres from the take-off point and at a distance of some 2300 -- 2205 kilometres from the intended target, at a cruising height of 405 -- 448 kilometres. The missile will drop to the level of 150 -- 130 kilometres in the 968th -- 975th second of its flight, but since the anti-missiles will be stationed in south-eastern Poland and since the anti-missiles must align themselves with the flight of the ballistic missile, the farthest possible point of contact will be some 600 kilometres from the intended target (some 2400 kilometres from the take-off point) at a height of some 380 kilometres. The ballistic missile will reach this point in approximately the 860th second of the flight.

So only some 480 -- 520 seconds will be probably available for the whole defence action (finding out the parametres of the ballistic missile flight, defining the characteristics of the flight of the anti-missiles, their take-off and their alignment with the flight of the ballistic missile). According to the views of some specialists dealing with anti-missile defence the time needed to assess the situation after the ballistic missile has been detected by the radar, to define the flight characteristics of the antimissiles and to launch them might be comparable with the time which was needed for the launch of anti-aircraft rockets used by the former anti-aircraft S-75 Volkhov anti-missile units, if they were in the highest state of alert, ie. 4 minutes (this information is, however, unconfirmed). If this is true, the first anti-missile could be launched between the 585th -- 615th seconds of the flight of the ballistic missile, which will by this time have reached the distance of 1490 -- 1580 kilometres from the take-off point and will be cruising at a height of 600 kilometres; some 245 seconds will be left to guide the anti-missiles to attack the ballistic missile.

Further information consists of mere estimates. The first anti-missile probably will not be able to hit the ballistic missile until after 200 seconds of flying, at a distance od some 2300 -- 2350 kilometres from the take-off point , so the timing of the counter-attack would be extremely tight. If the anti-missile misses the ballistic missile, there is no time to repeat the attack. These speculations need to be verified by modelling the process of guiding the anti-missile. The tests can be done but they need time and more information must be available.

2. An energetically non-optimal, low ballistic missile trajectory (the highest point 300 kilometres)

In this case, the ballistic missile will be detected by the radar first between the 403rd -- 440th second after its take-off, ie. at a distance of 1120 -- 1280 kilometres from the take-off point and 1880 -- 1720 kilometres from the target, at a height of 273-287 kilometres. Again, since the anti-missiles will be placed in south-eastern Poland and since the anti-missiles must align themselves with the flight of the ballistic missile, the farthest possible point of contact will be some 600 kilometres before the intended target (2400 kilometres from the take-off point), its height will be 184 kilometres and the ballistic missile will reach it in the 685th second of its flight.

Again, if it is true that the first anti-missile cannot be launched earlier than 240 seconds after it has been detected by the Brdy radar, ie. between the 643rd-680th seconds of the ballistic missile flight, at a point when it will have travelled 2215 -- 2375 kilometres since take-off, then the anti-missile will be launched too late!

Let us assume that the preparatory process will only take 120 seconds. Then the first anti-missile will be launched between the 523rd -- 560th second, when the ballistic missile will have travelled some 1660-1820 kilometres since take-off and it will be at a height of some 280 kilometres. The point of contact would come after the 150th second of the flight, at a distance of some 2300 kilometres from the take-off point and at a height of 190 kilometres, i.e., again, only at the very last moment. Again, there is no time to repeat the anti-missile strike.

The priority of the system is evidently to neutralise missiles aimed against the United Kingdom and the USA. The system is not designed to defend Central Europe. This, however, needs to be confirmed by further tests.

The low trajectory can be used if sufficiently effective missiles are available which are not restricted merely to the energetically optimum trajectory in order to cover the required distance. It is unlikely that Iran has currently the capability of launching a medium range missile using a low trajectory, unless it reduces the weight of the warhead.