WHAT'S ON BRITSKÉ LISTY

...yes, they considered a Soviet invasion possible

15. 7. 2010 / Karel Dolejší

Of course that after the 1956 invasion of Hungary and the violent response to that country's try at a more independent system, there was no way not to think about that possibility. Nevertheless, there was no will from either the political parties nor the government officials to do what is one of the basic tasks that someone who is in charge of a government does: to evaluate all alternatives that the future may bring. To claim that such a thought never came to anyone's minds is a huge lie from the representatives of Prague Spring. The same can be said about the American financeers when they claim to not have seen the upcoming crisis already in 2007.

A Czech version of this article is in CLICK HERE

Below is the most compact possible available example online of what happened in 1968 in relation to the possibility of a Soviet invasion:

At the press conference from July 15th 1968 [Lieutenant General Václav Prchlík, once a key ally of Dubček in the Army during the attempt by Antonín Novotný of organizing a military putsch] criticized how slow was the departure of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia after the military exercises called "Šumava" ended. And he even talked about the deficiencies of the Warsaw Pact. Later he was accused by the Soviet side of leaking confidential matters and rushed out of his functions by Soviet pressure.

Lieutenant General Prchlík's first call within the party's structures for getting ready to defend the country in case of an invasion were premonitory, however victimized by the Dubček people already before August 1968, later jailed and degrated to the condition of a common soldier.

That's how the leaders of the time reciprocated against the person without whom they would probably never have gotten to power and who had the guts to say things that nobody at the time wanted to see or hear...

If the communist leadership of the time would have done what they should -- meaning to take responsibility for the fate of their country -- then they should have analyzed with care the signals coming from the military information services and take the appropriate measures for the posibiltiy of an invasion.

Immediately after the invasion it must have been obvious to all that "someone up there" neglected something, or else they would not be all shocked... On top of that, nowadays we know rather reliably that at least the highest party structures were warned from many sides (from inside the then Czechoslovakia and also from the world).

Basically, I was trying to point out, in my reaction to Janýr's article, that it is suicidal to offer trust to politicians who, taking their previous performances, certainly don't deserve to be trusted -- and, God forbid, much less to connect with them some expectations, based on their fresh and untried, affected new political propaganda gestures.

Vytisknout

Obsah vydání | Pondělí 2.8. 2010