Excusive: Obama's Letter to Lula about Iran

27. 5. 2010

The daily had access to a copy of the complete letter, in which Obama suggested his idea of a way forward, dated April 20, just three weeks before Lula's trip to Iran, which resulted in the agreement.

It is natural therefore there is amazement with Washington's negative reaction to the agreement, before and after Iran had formalized it by letter to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency).

In the last 17 days, Brazil, Iran and Turkey signed an agreement under which Tehran pledged to send 1,200 kg of its stockpile of low enriched uranium to Turkey, its neighbor and then in a year to get back 120 kg of material processed at 20% for use in medical research.

The U.S. rejected the nuclear deal, labeling it a strategy by Iran to prevent further retaliation from the UN due to its nuclear program. A day after signing the agreement, the U.S. presented to the UN Security Council a proposal to impose new sanctions on Iran.

Turkey, Brazil and Iran have called for a suspension of discussions on the sanctions because the agreement on exchange of fuel, nevertheless Western powers suspect Iran's agreement is a tactic to avoid or delay penalties.

On Wednesday the president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, called on Obama to accept the nuclear deal brokered by Brazil and Turkey. He said the U.S. leader "will lose a historic opportunity for cooperation with Tehran rejects the case."

Here is an exclusive first hand view of the text of the letter, translated from the Portuguese translation:

"Mr President,

I would like to thank you for our meeting with Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey, during the Summit on Nuclear Safety. We dedicated some time to discuss Iran, the issue of supply of nuclear fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), and the intention of Turkey and Brazil of working to find an acceptable solution. I promised to respond in detail to your ideas, reflect carefully on our discussion and thus I would like to offer a detailed explanation of my perspective and suggest a way forward.

I agree with you that the TRR is an opportunity to pave the way for a broader dialogue in regard to solving the most fundamental concerns of the international community regarding Iran's nuclear program as a whole. From the beginning, I considered the request as an Iranian clear and tangible opportunity to begin to build mutual trust and thus create time and space for a constructive diplomatic process. This is why the U.S. supported so vigorously the proposal submitted by Mohamed El Baradei, former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The IAEA proposal was prepared in order to be fair and balanced, and allow both sides to gain confidence. For us, the Iranian agreement on the transfer of its 1,200 kilos of low enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country would strengthen confidence and reduce regional tensions, to substantially reduce inventories of LEU from Iran -- I want to emphasize that this element isof fundamental importance to the United States. As for Iran, the country would receive the nuclear fuel requested to ensure the continued operation of the TRR to produce the needed medical isotopes, and by using its own equipment, the Iranians would begin to demonstrate peaceful nuclear intentions.

Nevertheless, there is a continued challenge by Iran against the five resolutions of the Security Council which ordered them to end their uranium enrichment program. We would be prepared to support and facilitate action regarding a proposal that would provide nuclear fuel to Iran using uranium enriched by others as a demonstration of our willingness to work creatively in finding a way to build mutual trust.

In the course of consultations about it, we also recognize the desire for assurances on the part of Iran. As a result, my team has focused on ensuring that the IAEA proposal encompasses several clauses, including a national statement of support by the United States in order to send a clear signal of my government as to our willingness to become signatories, to direct and even potentially play a more conclusive role in the production process of fuel, also to emphasize the importance of a central role for Russia and the full custody of IAEA on nuclear material throughout the production process of fuel.

In practice, the IAEA's proposal offered to Iran guarantees and commitments significant and substantial to part of the IAEA members, like the United States and Russia. Dr. ElBaradei publicly stated last year that the United States would assume the vast majority of the risk, according to the proposal of the IAEA.

As we have discussed, Iran appears to be following a strategy designed to create the impression of flexibility, which if will agree with their actions, then that could begin to generate mutual trust. We have seen flashes of flexibility supplied by Iran to you and others, while formally reiterated a position unacceptable to the IAEA through official channels. Iran continues to reject the proposal of the IAEA and insists on retaining in its territory the low enriched uranium needed to the delivery of nuclear fuel. This is the position that Iran has formally transmitted to the IAEA in January and again in February 2010.

We understand that you, Turkey and others agree that Iran continues the retention of LEU in its territory until there is a simultaneous exchange of LEU for nuclear fuel. As pointed by Gen. [James] Jones [national security adviser in the White House] during our meeting, it would take a year to produce any volume of nuclear fuel. Thus, a greater confidence that the proposal could provide the IAEA would be completely eliminated for the United States, and various risks emerge. First, Iran could continue to expand its stockpile of LEU over that period, allowing them to accumulate a stock necessary for two or three nuclear weapons, within a year. Second, there is no guarantee that Iran would agree with the final exchange. Third, the "custody" of the IAEA on the Iranian territory in the LEU would offer us considerable improvement compared to the current situation, and the IAEA could not prevent Iran from resuming control of its uranium anytime.

There is a potentially important compromise that has been offered. In November, the IAEA sent to Iran our offer to allow Iran to transfer its 1200 LEU to a third country, specifically Turkey, early in the process, where it will be stored during the process of fuel production as collateral and Iran would receive back its uranium. Iran has never ruled that seriously as an offer of "security" and offered no credible explanation as to its rejection. I think it raises real questions regarding Iranian nuclear intentions. If Iran is not willing to accept an offer that demonstrates that their LEU is for peaceful, civilian purposes, I ask Brazil to urge Iran to regard the opportunity represented by this offer, to keep its uranium as a "security" in Turkey, while the nuclear fuel is being produced.

Throughout the process, instead of building trust, Iran is undermining confidence in the way we approach this opportunity. That's why I question Iran's willingness to dialogue in good faith with Brazil, as I warned you about in our meeting. To start a constructive diplomatic process, Iran needs to transmit to the IAEA a sign of compromise on the dialogue through the official channels -- something which so far they have not done.

Meanwhile, we will carry on our pursuit of sanctions on schedule as outlined. I also made clear that the doors are open to a rapprochement with Iran As you know, Iran so far has refused my offer of an unconditional and comprehensive dialogue.

I look forward to the next opportunity to meet you and discuss these issues, taking into account the challenge that Iran's nuclear program poses to the security of the international community, including through the UN Security Council.

Sincerely,

Barack Obama "

Vytisknout